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The Role of Commercial Insurance in Post-Disaster Recovery:  
Quantitative Evidence from the 2011 Christchurch Earthquake 
 
Abstract:  
We examine the role of business interruption insurance in business recovery following the 
Christchurch earthquake in 2011 in the short- and medium-term. In the short-term analysis, we 
ask whether insurance increases the likelihood of business survival in the aftermath of a 
disaster. We find only weak evidence that those firms that had incurred damage, but were 
covered by business interruption insurance, had higher likelihood of survival post-quake 
compared with those firms that did not have insurance. This absence of evidence may reflect 
the high degree of uncertainty in the months following the 2011 earthquake and the 
multiplicity of severe aftershocks. For the medium-term, our results show a more explicit role 
for insurance in the aftermath of a disaster. Firms with business interruption insurance have a 
higher probability of increasing productivity and improved performance following a 
catastrophe. Furthermore, our results show that those organisations that receive prompt and 
full payments of their claims have a better recovery, in terms of profitability and a subjective 
‘”better off” measure’ than those that had protracted or inadequate claim payments (less than 
80% of the claim paid within 2.5 years). Interestingly, the latter group does worse than those 
organisations that had damage but no insurance coverage. This analysis strongly indicates the 
importance not only of good insurance coverage, but of an insurance system that also delivers 
prompt claim payments.  As a first paper attempting to empirically identify a causal effect of 
insurance on business recovery, we also emphasize some caveats to our analysis. 
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1. Introduction and Background Information on the Earthquake 
The role of commercial insurance in supporting firms’ and organisations’ economic recovery in 
the aftermath of disasters is under-investigated. In theory, catastrophe insurance fulfills several 
roles. In particular, it is widely assumed that it: (1) transfers risk from individuals and 
organizations to insurance companies (Zweifel & Eisen, 2012); (2) through premium levels, it 
provides signals on risk levels faced by the insured firms (Kunreuther, 1996); (3) it provides for 
ex-ante risk mitigation to be undertaken by the insured firms through the design of premium-
reducing incentives (Kunreuther, 1996; Botzen et al., 2009); and (4) by providing financial 
resources, it assists in speeding up recovery of destroyed or damaged assets and returning 
firms to normal operations. Surprisingly, it is only mechanisms (1) and (2) that have been 
investigated in any detail. There is little evidence that convincingly demonstrates the last two 
hypothesized impacts of insurance contracts in assisting the commercial sector in dealing with 
catastrophe risk. Here, we focus on (4), and leave (3) for future examination of its efficacy. We 
ask: Post-catastrophe, do firms indeed face easier recovery if they were insured against that 
catastrophic risk? 
Understanding how insurance aids, or fails to aid, recovery in the aftermath of a natural 
disaster is of clear interest to many stakeholders; and is globally relevant as both the frequency 
and magnitude of disasters are increasing almost everywhere. Our objective is to investigate 
the role of insurance in business recovery in the aftermath of a catastrophic disaster. We use 
the Christchurch earthquake in 2011 as our case study. 
The Christchurch earthquake of 2011 was the worst natural disaster in New Zealand’s history, 
with an estimated loss of US$35 billion (Simpson, 2013). The quake hit Christchurch with a 
magnitude of 6.3 and with several big aftershocks in the following months. It caused 185 
fatalities and damaged over 100,000 buildings leading to over 450,000 residential damage 
claims submitted to the public insurer (the Earthquake Commission).1 The first major quake in 
this sequence was earlier in September 2010 with a magnitude of 7.1. The second and the third 
                                                             
1 Many properties have multiple claims based on different earthquake aftershocks and separate claims for building 
damage, land damage, and damage to contents (Marsh, 2014). 
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major quakes hit closer to the city of Christchurch on Feb. 22, 2011 and caused the most 
destructive loss. 
After the earthquake in February, about 1,600 commercial buildings in the Central Business 
District – about 60% of all the buildings in that area – were marked to be demolished 
(Stevenson et al., 2012a). As this earthquake was followed by over 3,000 aftershocks, the whole 
CBD area was cordoned off for a prolonged period of time, with the last cordoned area being 
made accessible almost two and a half years after the earthquake. This restricted access of the 
CBD constrained many businesses, including businesses that did not experience direct damage 
to their premises or property from the earthquake event (Stevenson et al., 2012b). 
The February earthquake has an estimated insured loss of US$16.5 billion. As such, it is ranked 
the sixth most expensive insured event to the insurance industry globally since 1980 
(MunichRe, 2015). The proportion of insured loss is exceptional for this event. About seventy 
percent of the direct recovery and reconstruction costs in Christchurch are expected to be 
covered by insurance (Wood et al., 2016). As a comparison, less than 20% of the estimated 
direct losses in Japan were insured (Höppe and Low, 2012). 
Estimates suggest that this is the most comprehensively insured earthquake in history, and 
maybe the most comprehensively insured natural hazard event as well (the only possible 
exception being some floods in European countries with mandatory insurance schemes like 
France (Michel-Kerjan and Kousky, 2010).  
Within New Zealand there had been few damaging earthquakes affecting large population 
areas within recent history before the Christchurch quake. Consequently, local insurance offices 
(typically subsidiaries of multi-national insurance companies) had little experience in dealing 
with such a large volume of claims in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake (ICNZ, 2014a). 
Since then, there have been continuing delays in claim settlement (Muir-Wood, 2012). About 
four years after the earthquake, between 10-40% of claims (by value) have not been settled, 
with large diversity across insurance firms (Wood et al. 2016). It appears that the majority of 
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unsettled claims, by value, are commercial claims (ICNZ, 2014b, and 2015)2; this is in contrast 
with the 2011 earthquake in Japan and the 2010 one in Chile where practically all claims were 
been completely settled in the two years directly following the event (Marsh, 2014). 
Interviews Resilient Organisations conducted with stakeholders yielded conflicting information 
about the speed of claim resolution. Many businesses felt that the claims resolutions 
proceeded too slowly, particularly business interruption claims and relocation assistance. 
Insurance industry interviewees, however, believed that on the whole the insurance industry 
performed well and processed commercial claims in a timely manner given their complexity. 
Deloitte (2015), reports that one insurance company has, as of mid-2014, settled about the 
same share of its residential and commercial portfolios (about 80% each). 
The objective here is to investigate the role of commercial insurance in business recovery by 
using the 2011 Christchurch earthquake as a case study. We aim to examine the role of 
insurance in both the short- and medium-term contexts. For the short-term investigation, we 
aim to find out whether insurance affected business continuity in the immediate aftermath, 
before most claims had even been examined. Our purpose is to observe if insurance increases 
the likelihood of business survival as the insured entities are aware of their insurance cover, 
and can expect to be able to fund their recovery through insurance claims (and payments). For 
the medium-term, we aim to investigate the role of insurance payments in supporting business 
recovery in terms of profitability and productivity.  
The earthquake in Christchurch is useful as a case study for several reasons: (1) Insurance cover 
was widely available and commonly purchased in New Zealand, making it easier to obtain a 
substantial sample of affected and unaffected insured firms. (2) The proportion of insured 
damage to total loss of the 2011 earthquake was substantial, so insurance is playing a big role 
in the general recovery of the region. (3) Given the existence of a public residential insurance 
scheme (EQC) and a public accident insurance scheme (ACC) that covers all healthcare-related 
                                                             
2 For instance, Deloitte (2015) reported that one of the larger general insurers in New Zealand “had made $3.8 billion in 
damage and business continuity claims payments, which represents about 80.0% of its total estimated costs. Of this, around 
25.0% of claims payments have been made to residential policyholders, and the remaining 75.0% to…commercial clients.” Their 
data is from mid-2014, three and a half years after the earthquake. 
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costs for an injury (by anyone present in New Zealand and including events like earthquakes), 
insurance in New Zealand is very affordable. As such, budget and credit constraints are less 
likely to have been inhibiting factors preventing firms from purchasing insurance. These 
constraints, present elsewhere, are therefore less likely to create a material difference between 
the insured and uninsured firms and that can bias statistical comparisons. (4) The surveys we 
use in the empirical analysis are detailed post-disaster surveys that include both questions 
about the nature of insurance coverage, the impact of the earthquake, and the nature and 
extent of continued post-disaster operations. It is this information that enables us to conduct 
the empirical study described herein. To our knowledge, this is the first research that examines 
empirically the role of commercial insurance in business recovery following a natural disaster 
but it builds on several qualitative analyses of the role of commercial insurance in 
organizational disaster recovery (Brown et al., 2013; Brown et al., in press, King et al., 2014, 
Seville et al., 2015). 
 
2. The Surveys 
We utilize the data of two business surveys prepared and collected by Resilient Organisations, a 
research organization based in New Zealand. The surveys were designed to be a longitudinal 
study of organizational resilience following the first earthquake in 2010 (when few predicted 
there would be a series of more destructive aftershocks). The questionnaire was sent to both 
for-profit and not-for-profit organizations located in Christchurch Central Business District and 
the affected areas around the Christchurch city. The questionnaire was primarily designed to 
measure the impact of the earthquakes on organizations and it asked firms about the level of 
damage and the disruption they experienced and how they were recovering. There was, 
however, a section devoted to capturing insurance data; and it is this section that enables us to 
undertake this empirical study on the role of insurance in the aftermath of a natural disaster. 
The data collection methods of both survey rounds were similar. Participants were initially 
contacted by phone in order to establish contact with the heads of the organizations. The 
questionnaire was then sent to their nominated person via physical or electronic address. The 
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firms were able to respond via phone call, online, or by mail. Figure 1 displays the survey 
timeline along with the date of the earthquakes. 
Figure 1. Survey timeline 
 
The first survey was conducted in the three to six months period after the February 2011 
earthquake. It was initially intended for following-up on the recovery process of the 2010 
earthquake but was then revised to also capture the short-term impact of the 2011 earthquake. 
For our study, this survey is used to capture the role of insurance in supporting immediate post-
quake continuity. The medium-term second survey was completed in 2013. It was designed to 
examine the progress of recovery a couple of years after the event. We use this survey to 
investigate the role of insurance claim payments in supporting reconstruction and recovery of 
business operations. The survey questions mostly require binary or scaled (Likert) responses. 
This includes most of the insurance related questions as well. More details on both surveys are 
available in an online appendix.3 
 
3. Insurance and Disasters: Literature Review 
                                                             
3 The online appendix is available at: https://sites.google.com/site/noyeconomics/research/natural-disasters. 
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Insurance was recently recognized as one of the vital mitigation tools against loss and damage 
from natural disasters in the newly agreed Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 
(UNISDR, 2015). Insurance allows individuals and businesses to transfer all or part of their risk 
exposure to insurance companies in exchange for a premium payment. It is important as a 
mitigation tool especially in the case of catastrophic loss when the magnitude of loss is large 
and the affected entities require external financial resources to support their recovery. As 
catastrophic disaster risk is spatially much more concentrated than more standard insured risk 
(e.g., risk of fire), insurance can play a critical role in providing funds to support recovery in the 
disaster’s aftermath. However, the literature on this role for insurance is very limited. What is 
the extent to which insurance assists or can assist individuals and businesses to recover? 
In reviewing the literature on natural disaster insurance, we focus on the role of insurance as a 
tool of mitigation against natural disasters. In particular, some literature focuses on the study of 
underinsurance. For example, CEBR (2012) found significant under-insurance in all the recent 
major disasters they examined. For instance, 83% of the damage caused by the Great East 
Japan earthquake and tsunami of 2011 was not insured (CEBR, 2012). New Zealand has much 
higher insurance cover, but even there the uninsured portion is significant in the commercial 
sector (Muir-Wood, 2012; Deloitte, 2015). Schanz and Wang (2014), moreover, found that this 
insurance gap has widened during the past 40 years, from 0.02 percent to 0.13 percent of 
global GDP.  
Possibly the only paper that has looked directly at the empirical role of insurance in post-
disaster recovery is von Peter et al. (2012), though it approached this question from a 
macroeconomic perspective. Using panel cross-country growth regressions, it found that while 
the uninsured part of disaster losses adversely impacts the entire economy, insured losses 
seem to be benign, in terms of their impact on economic growth post-event. 
It is important to note that in many cases, extreme catastrophic risk insurance is not available 
from private insurers (Kleindorfer & Kunreuther, 1999). For instance, flood insurance in both 
the U.S. and the Netherlands is not available from commercial insurers but is only offered by 
government entities (Knowles & Kunreuther, 2014; Botzen & Van Den Bergh, 2008). In an 
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example more pertinent to our investigation here, residential earthquake risk was typically 
excluded from insurance contracts in California (a distinctly quake-prone region) until the 
government established a publicly funded insurance program. Interestingly, in New Zealand, 
there is no public sector involvement in the commercial insurance sector, yet commercial 
earthquake insurance is widely available and is typically included as a standard part of fire 
insurance policies. As stated earlier, the wide availability and affordability of commercial 
earthquake insurance in New Zealand is most likely due to the availability of public first-tranche 
residential insurance, the universal coverage for any injury-related healthcare costs, and very 
intensive marketing of insurance by banks. 
4. Method, Data, and Results – First Survey 
One of the value propositions of commercial earthquake insurance is that insured firms are 
aware that costs associated with damages incurred by an earthquake could be reimbursed. The 
first hypothesis examined in this paper is that, given the ‘promise’ of future reimbursement, 
firms are more likely to take steps that will enable them to continue operations.  To examine 
this question we use data from the first Christchurch business survey, done only a few months 
after the earthquake.  
In analyzing the difference in survival rates between insured and uninsured firms, we use a 
combination of Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and a Linear Probability Model (LPM). This 
approach is used to overcome a number of methodological challenges. 
Potentially, the set of firms that had purchased insurance before the earthquake may be 
different than the set of firms that had not. If this is the case, it would be an example of 
‘selection bias’ when the selection for treatment (to use the terminology common in micro-
econometrics) is not random and the different characteristics of treatment and non-treatment 
firms lead to misleading statistics when measuring treatment effects. If the selection bias, 
however, is observable (i.e. the different characteristics of treatment and non-treatment firms 
are observable) then there are several ways to overcome this bias. In an ideal case, and with 
enough observations, one could potentially find firms that have exactly the same observable 
characteristics but differed in their decision as to whether to purchase insurance. The best 
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analogy for this is the twins’ studies that are common in, for example, psychological research 
on the nature/nurture dichotomy. This approach is very uncommon, as it would require a large 
enough pool of observations to allow for this perfect matching.  
A ‘matching’ algorithm was proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), matching the pre-
treatment observations using estimated propensity scores for treatment. The propensity score 
is an estimated index that describes the probability of receiving treatment (in this case, the 
purchasing of insurance). The propensity scores for each observed unit are typically calculated 
from a limited dependent variable model (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). Once every firm has an 
associated propensity score, the balancing between the treatment and control groups is done 
in two steps. First, the sample is reduced by removing all those observations whose associated 
propensity scores fall outside the common support for the treated and control groups. In the 
second stage, Dehejia & Wahba (2002) described several potential matching algorithms, 
including stratification matching, one-to-one nearest neighbor matching, and radius matching.  
For our purpose, the use of propensity score estimation as a means to control for selection bias 
allows us to ‘ignore’ the differences between firms that chose insurance and firms that did not. 
Thus, the propensity score in this study is the probability of insurance adoption prior to the 
earthquake, which we estimate as follows: Pr (𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖 = 1|𝑋𝑖)  =  𝐹(𝑋𝑖
′𝛽). Where 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖  is a binary 
indicator that denotes 1 if the firm had insurance at the time of the earthquake and 0 
otherwise. 𝑋𝑖  is a set of pre-treatment observables. 𝛽 is a vector of the estimated coefficients 
of 𝑋𝑖. 𝐹 is the logistic cumulative distribution function.  
We match the observations by stratifying the sample into quartiles using the propensity scores 
associated with each observation. Stratification matching based on the estimated propensity 
scores is preferable for this study because we have a relatively small number of observations. 
Implementing other matching algorithms would have reduced the sample further. Besides, it 
allows us to add other control variables to capture the post-quake damage and disruption that 
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are not included in the propensity scores estimation and matching.4 The model to estimate the 
effect of insurance on short-term business continuity is thus: 
Pr(𝑌𝑖 = 1|𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖, 𝑍𝑖) = 𝛼 + 𝜏 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖 + 𝛾 𝑍𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖    (1) 
Where 𝑌𝑖  is the outcome variable (this variable notes whether the firm continued its operation 
after the earthquake and is not permanently closed) and 0 otherwise. 𝑍𝑖 is a vector of control 
variables. 𝜏 is the estimated average treatment effect of insurance on the outcome variable. 𝛾 is 
a vector of the estimated coefficients of 𝑍𝑖. 𝑢𝑖 is the error term. After we stratify the sample by 
the estimated propensity scores into four strata, we estimate the model for each stratum 
separately. White’s standard errors are used to correct for heteroskedasticity. 
We categorize the variables into two groups: variables for propensity scores estimation 
(likelihood of purchasing insurance) and variables for the regression analysis (eq. 1). We adapt 
the list of explanatory variables that potentially influence business continuity from Webb et al. 
(2002).  
The sixteen pre-treatment variables using in estimating the propensity scores, including the 
means and standard deviations, are listed in Table 1; these include variables measuring firm 
size, ownership, location, sector, and risk management practices.  
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Table 2 shows the estimated coefficients of logit regression. The mean and the standard 
deviation of the estimated propensity scores are 0.757 and 0.184, respectively. The range of the 
estimated propensity scores is between 0.261 and 0.993. As noted by Schafer and Kang (2008), 
the fit statistics of the propensity model are more important in propensity scores estimation 
than the coefficient results for each variable (or their statistical significance). The common 
support from the estimated propensity scores in our study is [0.351, 0.915]. Consequently, we 
                                                             
4 Imbens (2004) proposed that a combination of propensity score matching and regression estimation would 
provide more efficient estimators than propensity score matching alone because the propensity score method 
does not account for the correlation between the outcome variables and other post-treatment variables. 
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remove 35 outliers from the estimation.5 Figure 1 shows the boxplot before and after 
eliminating the outliers. After removing the outliers, the estimated propensity scores of the 
treated and control units are better matched.  
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
We next stratify the data into four sub-groups based on the estimated propensity scores.6 After 
stratifying the data, we find that there is no significant difference-in-mean of propensity scores 
between the treated and the non-treated firms in each stratum. This indicates that each 
stratum contains only firms with similar characteristics and have identical likelihood to acquire 
insurance. We further test the difference-in-mean of all covariates in each stratum. While we 
find some significant differences in the mean of some covariates in some blocks, minor 
covariates’ imbalance is allowed, as we do not implement exact one-to-one matching. At this 
stage, the observations in each stratum are assumed to be indifferent (pre-quake) in all ways 
except the treatment conditions (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).  
                                                             
5 These are firms with very high propensity scores (those firms that have high likelihood to purchase insurance) and 
firms with very low scores (those firms that have low likelihood to purchase insurance). 
6 We initially tested the differences-in-mean of the covariates in both five and four strata using the standard t-test 
as suggested by Dehejia and Wahba (2002). The covariates between the treatment and the control groups in each 
block are more similar when stratifying into four sub-groups. 
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For the Linear Probability Model, which allows us to control for post-quake conditions, the main 
outcome of interest is whether the firm survives in the aftermath of the earthquake. Most firms 
temporarily closed in the immediate aftermath. Therefore, we define survival as firms that 
were not permanently closed three to six months after the incident. Two insurance variables, 
property damage insurance (INS) and business interruption insurance (BI) are included in the 
model to see the effect of insurance on the outcome variables. The control variables include 
the post-quake change in revenue, the structural and non-structural damage, the impact of the 
earlier 2010 earthquake, and the financial recovery plans of the firms. The descriptive statistics 
of these are provided in table 2. 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
After stratifying the data based on the estimated propensity scores discussed previously, we 
estimate the LPM on each block separately, using White’s standard errors. These results are 
reported in Table 4.  
In the upper panel, we provide results for the specification without control variables using only 
the insurance variable (INS) as an independent variable. The coefficient in the 4th stratum, 
which includes the firms that have the highest likelihood of acquiring insurance, is positive, 
whereas for the other strata it is negative (in block 2, the negative sign is statistically significant 
at the 10% level). We note that the positive coefficient is much larger in absolute value, so on 
balance we conclude that there is little evidence to suggest that the knowledge of the insurance 
coverage had much impact on firms’ decisions in the immediate and short-run aftermath of the 
earthquakes. These results do remain once we add the control variables —those that control 
for the damage of the earthquake. The overall fit of the models is not very high, and while the 
P-value is still statistically significant for the overall model and the first two strata, over all, our 
model is not able to predict firm short-term survival very well. 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Nevertheless, once we include all the control variables, the insurance variable in all blocks 
becomes positive. The firms in the highest stratum, which are the firms with the highest 
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likelihood of acquiring insurance, seems to get the highest survival benefit from insurance – 
they are 13.1 percentage point more likely to survive the earthquake than comparable firms 
(firms with similar likelihoods of purchasing insurance). We reiterate, however, that these 
positive results are not statistically robust. Intriguingly, the results for business interruption 
insurance are even less encouraging, with some of the estimated coefficients being negative. 
Again, however, none of these results are statistically significant under typical confidence 
levels. We therefore conclude that we find little evidence to support the hypothesis that 
insurance supports immediate business recovery in the aftermath of a disaster. 
 
5.  Method, Data, and Results: Second Survey 
In the time frame considered in the second survey, all insured firms have notified their claims to 
the insurance companies. In this instance, the role of insurance should be more apparent as in 
many cases at least some insurance funds were already disbursed. Therefore, the objective in 
our analysis of the second survey is to investigate the more direct role of insurance claims in 
supporting firms’ recovery. The insurance section in the questionnaire asked firms if they 
planned to finance their recovery through insurance, what type of insurance they had at the 
time of the earthquake, whether they had submitted claims, whether they believed their 
insurance coverage was adequate, and what proportion of their claim was already paid out.  
This survey was undertaken in 2013.7 Participants were required to have had one or more 
premises located in the districts that experienced serious physical damage by the 2011 
earthquake: Christchurch city, Selwyn, and Waimakariri districts. Firms were sampled from 19 
different sectors.8 The questionnaire was sent to 2,176 unique organizations; response rate was 
approximately 25%. After removing non-valid and incomplete responses, the sample we used 
included 461 participant firms.9 About one-half of the sample firms employ less than 10 people, 
                                                             
7 See Brown et al. (2014) for detailed description of the survey.  
8 Sectors were defined according to the Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification (ANZSIC). 
9 Responses were considered non-valid in cases of duplicates responses from the same firm, surveys with missing 
information for some of the key questions, and responses from public sector. 
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with most of these organizations employing between 1 to 5 people. 432 observed firms were 
insured with property damage insurance; 288 (67%) were insured with both property damage 
and business interruption insurance; and 375 observations had all three types of insurance.  
Just 1% of our survey respondents were no longer in operation, so the survey results reported 
here do not adequately represent ceased businesses.  It is interesting to note, however, that 
the average annual death rate for businesses in Canterbury (which normally sits at around 10 
percent) did not change significantly in the years following the earthquake.  Annual death rates 
of businesses were at 9.7%, 10.1% and 9.1% in 2011, 2012, 2013 respectively (Statistics New 
Zealand, 2014).  
 We focus on the insured observations for the analysis in this section, in order to prevent any 
unobserved differences between insured and uninsured firms.  
Only 70% of the insured firms had filed an earthquake-related claim. Since practically everyone 
in the affected districts experienced some impact from the earthquakes, two plausible 
explanations are that their insurance terms did not cover the damage they incurred and/or the 
cost of damage for these organizations may have been lower than the policy deductible.  
Notably, only half of the sample believed their insurance was/is adequate. Of those that had 
submitted a claim, nearly 45% had received almost full payout (defined as >80%) on their 
submitted claims. However, only 38% of the total sample of insured firms had received almost 
full payout by the time of the survey and also believed that their coverage was adequate.  
As we are constrained by the survey questions, the outcome variables of interest we are 
considering are all binary. As such, we use a logistic model in this analysis. The model to 
estimate the effect of insurance on business recovery is as follows: 
Pr(𝑌𝑖 = 1|𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖, 𝑋𝑖) = 𝐹(𝛼 + 𝜏 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖)      (2) 
Where 𝑌𝑖  is the outcome variable denoting 1 if the response to the survey question was 
positive, and 0 otherwise. 𝑋𝑖  is a vector of control variables. The list of outcome variables and 
independent variables and some descriptive statistics are included in Table 5. 𝜏 is the estimated 
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average treatment effect of insurance on the outcome variable. 𝛽 is a vector of the estimated 
coefficients of 𝑋𝑖 . 𝐹 is the cumulative distribution function of logistic distribution.  
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
With a logistic specification for the probability function, the marginal effect is given by:  
𝜕Pr (𝑌=1)
𝜕(𝑧𝑖)
=  
𝑒𝑧𝛽
(1+ 𝑒𝑧𝛽)
2
𝜕(𝑧𝛽)
𝜕(𝑧𝑖)
=  
𝑒𝑧𝛽
(1+ 𝑒𝑧𝛽)
2 𝛽       (3) 
Where 𝑧𝛽 = (𝛼 + 𝜏 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖).  
In this study, we emphasize two insurance questions: whether the firm had business 
interruption insurance, and whether the firm received an adequate and timely payout.  
Our analysis uses three different perspectives to evaluate whether organizations have 
recovered from the disaster: profitability, productivity and whether they are better or worse off 
after the earthquakes.  In terms of profitability, 48% of sample are firms with BI and are 
profitable. Overall, there are more profitable firms in the sample than firms considering 
themselves unprofitable. In terms of increased productivity, 37% of the sample had BI and 
increased their productivity in the aftermath. However, only 19% of the sample firms were 
adequately insured. Only 28% of the sample indicated that they were adequately insured and 
profitable. There was roughly an equal number of firms that increased their productivity level 
versus otherwise (decreased or unchanged). In the survey, there was one question asking 
whether the firm was better off after the earthquake. Approximately 30% of firms with BI were 
better off, while only 17% of adequately and timely insured firms were better off. The number 
of observations is detailed in the Appendix, which also presents the total number of 
observations in different categories, classified into firms that had business interruption 
insurance and firms that were adequately insured with nearly full payout.  
A large share of the firms in our sample are in retail and wholesale trade, or manufacturing. The 
original survey has a total of 19 different sectors but we use only 6 sectors for analysis. The six 
sectors are health care and social assistance, manufacturing, construction, accommodation, 
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financial services and insurance, and retail and wholesale trade.10 Within each industry, the 
majority of firms also adopted business interruption insurance except in construction, which 
had approximately equal share of firms with or without BI.    
Regarding the damage from the earthquake, most firms experienced damage and loss but not 
all of them reported that their business operations were also disrupted. Three main statistics 
are presented, including structural damage, nonstructural damage and difficulties accessing the 
premises. The business operations of most firms were disrupted by nonstructural damage 
(47%), which includes damage to furniture, fixture, fittings, inventory, motor, and equipment, 
and machinery breakdown. Approximately 38% of the total sample also experienced structural 
damage, and 29% of firms were disrupted because of difficulties of getting access to the 
business sites.  
In estimating equation 2, there are three possible outcome (dependent) variables, two core 
(independent) variables of interest, and a number of control variables. The first outcome 
variable is the profitability of firms after disaster. Current positive financial status of the 
affected organizations after a disaster is a proxy for measuring how well a firm is performing 
after the disaster. As there are both for-profit and not-for-profit organizations in this study, we 
use the status of financial surplus for the not-for-profit organizations instead of profitability.11 
The second outcome variable is the productivity of firms after the disaster. The survey question 
asked firms if their current productivity greatly/slightly increased, decreased or remained the 
same. We note 1 if the organization’s level of productivity has slightly/greatly increased and 0 
otherwise. The third outcome variable is whether the firm is better-off as a result of the 
earthquake. Even though this question is especially subjective, it may still be informative. This 
                                                             
10 Some sectors are not included due to small number of observations (less than 10), uninsurable for property and 
business interruption insurance (e.g. agriculture), and no literature of economic implications of disaster impact 
(e.g. arts). In addition, some sectors are left out of the model because the overall model is better fit without 
(higher pseudo R2). 
11 For for-profit organizations, we note whether profitability is moderate or high; for not-for-profit organizations, 
whether they had a financial surplus at the time of the survey. 
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variable equals 1 if the firm is significantly or slightly better off as a result of the earthquake and 
0 otherwise. 
There are two core (independent) variables of interest for us. The first is whether the 
organization had business interruption insurance at the time of the earthquake. This variable is 
a binary choice that equals 1 if the firm had business interruption insurance at the time of the 
earthquake and 0 otherwise. Since all units in this study had property damage insurance (which 
includes insurance coverage for furniture, fixture, fitting, contents, equipment, and machinery 
breakdown), this variable captures the additional/marginal impact of adding business 
interruption coverage to the property insurance. Business interruption insurance (BI) covers 
loss of revenue and/or increased cost of working following a damage to the insured property. 
The claim payout from BI is mainly expected to lower the adverse impact of the loss of revenue. 
The ‘increased cost of working’ coverage provides support for increased expenditures such as 
hiring temporary stuff, and/or renting temporary facilities.12 This analysis asks whether the 
business interruption insurance provides additional benefit to organizational recovery as 
opposed to those without BI coverage. We exclude motor insurance from this analysis because 
business interruption insurance is covered only with property damage insurance policy. 
The second core variable is whether the firm had received a timely and/or adequate insurance 
payout. In this analysis, we focus on the organizations that had all the three types of insurance, 
i.e. property damage, business interruption, and motor insurance. We separate the 
organizations into three categories: (1) those that did not make a claim; (2) those that made a 
claim, but less than 80% had been paid out at the time of the survey (2.5 years after the 
earthquakes); and (3) those that had received over 80% of their claimed amount. Each category 
was set as a binary variable with 1 if they belonged to the category and 0 if not. These variables 
proxy the extent that insurance provides a supportive role for recovery when the affected 
organization receives a timely payment and/or is adequately insured.  
                                                             
12 The coverage for increased cost of working is an add-on option with additional premium. We are not able to 
identify which type of BI coverage is available for each firm. 
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There are a total of 25 control variables we use from this survey; these can be categorized into 
five main categories. The first category is industry sector. We use six binary variables to 
represent industry sectors: health care and social assistance, manufacturing, construction, 
accommodation and food services, financial and insurance services, and retail and wholesale 
trade. We use four variables to represent ownership structure: sole proprietorship, partnership 
organizations, private limited liability company, and public limited liability company. The third 
category is the organizations’ size, as measured by the number of employees. The fourth 
category is the causes of disruption brought about by the earthquake. We have three variables 
capturing different causes of business disruption after the earthquake: whether the firm was 
disrupted by structural damage, by non-structural damage, and whether the firm had 
difficulties accessing their business premises (these are not mutually exclusive). Additionally, we 
have three variables to capture the financial situation of each firm: The proportion of the firm’s 
revenue coming from the Canterbury region prior to the earthquake; the presence of high 
outstanding debt; and whether the firm finances its recovery by spending from its own sources. 
All three can potentially affect a firm’s ability to recover successfully, and might also be 
correlated with the presence of insurance. Last, we also measure the total number of locations 
in Canterbury and the rest of New Zealand for each firm, the number of years that the firm had 
been operating prior to the earthquake, whether the firm is for-profit, and whether the firm 
had emergency plans in place at the time of the earthquake. The regression of core variables 
without any control variables has 432 observations, but only 416 observations for the 
regression when including the control variables. 
As discussed earlier, the first core variable is whether the firm had adopted business 
interruption insurance at the time of the earthquake. Table 6 displays the estimated results: 
When regressing without any control variables, the presence of additional business interruption 
coverage seems to positively affect both firms’ profitability and their productivity. These results 
largely remain when adding control variables, even if the pattern of statistical significance 
changes somewhat, with the affect on profitability no longer statistically significant and the 
affect on subjective perception of improved circumstances (better-off) now statistically 
significant (at 5% level). 
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TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
The second core variable is the timeliness and adequacy of insurance payments. As we detailed 
earlier, we split the organizations that had all three types of insurance coverage into three 
groups: those that did not claim insurance, those that claimed but had not been paid fully, and 
those that had been paid fully (over 80% of their claim). Table 7 shows the logit regression 
results for this variable. Without control variables, those organizations that did not claim 
insurance and those that received a timely, full payment of their claim reported being better off 
and having higher profitability compared to those that experienced protracted or inadequate 
claim payments (less than 80% of claim had been paid at the time of survey).  In addition, not 
having insurance or having a fully settled claim were statistically significant predictors of being 
‘better off’ after the earthquakes.  When adding the control variables, the same patterns in the 
data are evident, however these groupings are not statistically significant predictors of post-
earthquake performance.   In terms of productivity, the three groupings all show statistically 
significant, positive effects on increased productivity.  Interestingly, when the control variables 
are added, those with protracted or inadequate claim settlements indicate higher levels of 
productivity than the other two groups.  This may potentially be because the organisations 
were having to work harder to make up for the slow or inadequate insurance settlement. 
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
Table 8 summarizes the information and displays the average marginal effects of the core 
variables measuring insurance coverage on the outcome variables (profitability, productivity, 
and subjective perception). Having business interruption insurance has an average marginal 
effect of 3.5 (8.11) with (without) control variables on profitability. The result is significant 
without control variables. This means that having business interruption insurance, holding 
other things equal, increased the probability of being profitable by 3.5 percentage points. When 
a firm adopted business interruption insurance, it has a probability of increasing its productivity 
level post disaster that is higher by 15 percentage points. For the subjective measure, business 
interruption insurance shows significant results; a firm that chose to take out business 
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interruption insurance had a higher probability of being better off after the earthquake by 
approximately 8.6 percentage points. 
TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
The measure for adequate and timely insurance payments, however, shows that having a 
protracted or inadequate insurance payment can have a notable impact on post-earthquake 
performance.  However, the results are only significant without control variables: having a fully 
settled claim 2.5 years after the earthquakes increased an organisation’s profitability level by 
14 percentage points, compared to just 4 percentage points for those with protracted claims.  
Similarly, those with fully settled claims (and those with no claim) indicated they were better 
off (15 and 16 percentage points respectively) than those with a protracted or inadequate claim 
payment (8 percentage points). 
 
6. Conclusions and Discussion 
We examine the role of insurance in business recovery following the Christchurch earthquake in 
2011 in the short- and medium-term. The central question we pose, in the short-term analysis, 
is whether insurance increases the likelihood of business survival in the aftermath of a disaster. 
We find only weak evidence that those firms that had both property damage and business 
interruption had higher likelihood of survival post-quake. Whether this failure to find more 
robust evidence of insurance impact is an attribute of our data, or of problems in the way the 
insurance sector operated in the immediate aftermath of the Christchurch earthquake, remains 
an open question. For medium-term analysis, our results show a more explicit role for 
insurance in the aftermath of the disaster. Firms with business interruption insurance have 
higher probabilities of increasing productivity and improved performance following the 
catastrophe. Business interruption insurance significantly increases the likelihood of enhanced 
productivity – by approximately 15 percentage points. However, it is possible that this is a 
reflection on the type of businesses that take out business interruption coverage, rather than 
on the actual post earthquake impact of the insurance.  A second line of analysis was carried 
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out to better understand the impact of insurance post-disaster.  Our results show that those 
businesses that received prompt and full payments of their claims had a better recovery, in 
terms of profitability and a subjective ‘better off’ measure,’ than those that had protracted or 
inadequate claim payments (less than 80% of the claim paid within 2.5 years).  This latter 
analysis strongly indicates the importance not only of good insurance coverage but of an 
insurance system that also delivers prompt claim payments.  These results support earlier 
qualitative analysis into the role of insurance on business recovery, which found that high levels 
of under-insurance and delayed claim settlements resulted in delayed recovery (Brown et al., 
2013; Brown et al., in press, King et al., 2014, Seville et al., 2015). 
As a first paper attempting to empirically identify a causal effect of insurance on business 
recovery, we emphasize some caveats. First, we would have preferred to have data on the 
actual property damage claims and the amount of business interruption claims each firm had 
(and relative to each firm’s size and revenue). Second, details on the timing of claim payments 
would help to further clarify the impact of payment delays.  Third, information on non-insured 
losses would help to understand the issue of adequacy of insurance and to distinguish and 
separate this from the timeliness of claim settlement. Fourth, if we had had the actual break-
down of BI claims, into loss of revenue and increased cost of working, we would have been able 
to further provide details on the precise role of business interruption insurance in determining 
firm performance. 
Insurers are not willing to provide coverage for natural disasters for several reasons (e.g. 
Kunreuther, 1996; Jaffee & Russell, 1997; Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, 2009a; Kousky, 2010; 
Linnerooth-Bayer et al., 2011). One of these reasons is that catastrophic risk is often an 
unknowable risk, which makes it difficult to estimate future occurrences, which in turn makes 
determining actuarially fair pricing impractical (Kunreuther & Pauly, 2006). Consequently, the 
insurers charge higher premiums to compensate for the unknown risk of a disaster (Kunreuther 
& Michel-Kerjan, 2009b). As a result, the higher premium rate discourages individuals and 
businesses from buying insurance protection and hence demand for disaster insurance is lower. 
The high cost of protecting future uncertainty may be unattractive as compared to the needs of 
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day-to-day expenditures; this is especially true for budget-constrained individuals (Kunreuther 
& Michel-Kerjan, 2009c; Linnerooth-Bayer et al., 2011; OECD, 2013).  
In addition, insurers are reluctant to insure catastrophic risk because it requires them to 
accumulate high loss reserve due to the potential severity of disaster risk (Jaffee & Rusell, 1997; 
Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, 2009b). Jaffee and Russel (1997) pointed out that there are 
additional costs associated with carrying capital as loss reserve, such as tax and accounting 
expenses, and these additional costs further discourage insurers from supplying disaster 
insurance.  
The most notable paper examining the role of insurance in recovery from disasters is the paper 
by Kunreuther (1996). He pointed out that insurance has two main roles in dealing with natural 
disasters. The first is that it provides indemnification for any loss or damage from natural 
disasters, and hence, it relieves the cost to recover physical loss and/or financial loss for the 
affected policyholders. The second role of insurance is to encourage implementation of loss 
prevention programs. Insurers have a role in promoting the application of loss preventive 
measures by offering incentives, such as premium reductions, to encourage the insured to 
apply preventive measures. In addition, insurance provides price signals regarding the degree of 
expected risk in different locations and by different asset types (Kunreuther, 1996). However, 
as in some cases disaster insurance is subsidized through public insurance programs, this lower 
premium might misrepresent the actual degree of risk and lower the effort of implementing 
mitigation tools (Cummins and Mahul, 2009). In practice, insurance companies do not 
commonly offer sufficiently deep discounts on premium to make investment in effective 
prevention an attractive enough proposition (Doherty et al., 2008).  
What is not addressed in this literature is how well insurance is performs as a mitigation tool in 
the aftermath of a natural disaster. How does insurance support disaster recovery? In which 
areas or sectors is it more efficient? To what extent? To our knowledge, these questions have 
not been answered. Analyzing these questions would shed light on the precise benefits of 
adopting insurance as a means to support reconstruction and/or recovery in the aftermath of a 
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natural disaster, and would enable a more comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of disaster 
insurance. 
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Figure 1:  Boxplot of estimated propensity scores before (left) and after (right) matching 
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Table 1:  Pre-earthquake variables for estimating propensity scores 
Variable 
Insured Uninsured 
M SD M SD 
Firm Size 
ESMALL5 1 = Less than 5 full-time employees  0.5 0.51 0.71 0.47 
ELARGE50 1 = More than 50 full-time employees  0.18 0.39 0.18 0.39 
Organisational Ownership Structure 
OSOLE 1 = Sole proprietorship 0.33 0.47 0.3 0.47 
OLTD 1 = Limited liability company 0.29 0.46 0.39 0.5 
Location Before the Earthquake 
LCBD 1 = Located in Central Business District 0.1 0.3 0.15 0.36 
LLYT 1 = Located in Lyttleton Town Centre 0.28 0.45 0.18 0.39 
Sector 
BRT 1 = Retail trade 0.26 0.44 0.27 0.45 
BFMCG 1 = FMCG (Fast-Moving Consumer Goods) 0.17 0.37 0.09 0.29 
BUTIL 1 = Lifeline utilities 0.13 0.33 0.09 0.29 
Risk Management Practice 
RDPT 1 = Have risk management department/staff 0.79 0.42 0.74 0.45 
RBCM 1 = Have business continuity plan 0.29 0.46 0.36 0.49 
REMG 1 = Had practiced emergency response 0.32 0.47 0.36 0.49 
Other 
ROI 
1 = Positive average annual return on 
investment in the past 5 years 
0.41 0.5 0.21 0.42 
OWN 1 = Own the business premises 0.32 0.47 0.15 0.36 
PROF 1 = For-profit organization 0.91 0.3 0.77 0.44 
NSITE Number of sites (nationwide) 54.56 485.89 16.21 53.34 
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Table 2:  Estimated coefficients of propensity scores  
Variable Coefficient  Robust S.E. 
ESMALL5 -1.33 ** 0.62 
ELARGE50 -1.27 * 0.84 
OSOLE -0.32  0.59 
OLTD -0.92  0.74 
LCBD -0.30  0.68 
LLYT 0.60  0.67 
BRT -0.29  0.54 
BFMCG 1.34 * 0.78 
BUTIL 0.86  0.93 
RDPT 0.51  0.52 
RBCM -1.00 * 0.63 
REMG -0.43  0.59 
ROI 0.72  0.56 
OWN 0.00  0.00 
PROF 0.92 * 0.61 
NSITE 1.08  0.65 
Constant 1.05  0.80 
 
Log-likelihood -64.6207   
Wald χ2 26.9   
P-value 0.0426 **  
Pseudo R2  0.1674    
Significance level 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.1* 
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Table 3:  Post-earthquake variables for estimating firm survival, including insurance takeup 
Variable Definition 
Insured Uninsured 
M SD M SD 
Outcome Variable 
SURV 1 = Still operating / not permanently closed 0.9 0.31 0.89 0.33 
Insurance 
INS 1 = Had property damage insurance 0.76 0.43 N/A 
BI 1 = Had business interruption insurance 0.64 0.48 N/A 
Change in Revenue After the Earthquake  
REVDE 1 = the firm's revenue had decreased  0.5 0.51 0.45 0.51 
REVCH Percentage change in revenue -18.02 40.38 -18.21 32.96 
Structural and Non-Structural Damage  
DSTRUC 
1 = Moderately or highly disrupted by structural 
damage 
0.53 0.51 0.45 0.51 
DNONSTR 
1 = Moderately or highly disrupted by non-
structural damage 
0.53 0.51 0.36 0.49 
Affected by the earlier 2010 Earthquake 
BREVDE 1 = Firm's revenue had decreased post 2010 eq  0.41 0.5 0.33 0.48 
Financial Recovery 
RINS 1 = Plan to recover through insurance 0.43 0.5 N/A 
RCF 1 = Finance recovery with cash flow 0.72 0.46 0.62 0.5 
RWAGE 1 = Entitled to earthquake wage subsidy 0.34 0.48 0.18 0.39 
CDAY Number of closing days 8.27 24.53 10.22 28.05 
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Table 4:  Estimated coefficients of Limited Probability Model (LPM) 
Variables 
All Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE 
 
No control variables 
INS 0.014 0.063 -0.013 0.153 -0.15 0.083* -0.091 0.064 0.286 0.206 
_cons 0.882 0.056 0.846 0.104 1 N/A 1 N/A 0.667 0.2 
 
With control variables 
INS 0.062 0.065 0.096 0.187 0.077 0.133 0.065 0.133 0.131 0.373 
BI -0.029 0.057 -0.238 0.274 -0.237 0.166 0.018 0.169 0.192 0.191 
CDAY 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.088 0.07 
REVDE -0.064 0.08 -0.341 0.171 0.352 0.208 -0.036 0.165 0.059 0.216 
REVCH 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.009 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.003 
DSTRUC -0.123 0.056 0.014 0.225 -0.114 0.115 0.127 0.187 -0.311 0.18 
DNONSTR -0.085 0.05 -0.375 0.315 0.132 0.135 -0.229 0.171 0.029 0.088 
BREVDE 0.068 0.059 0.052 0.309 0.049 0.12 0.203 0.138 0.057 0.135 
RINS 0.022 0.063 -0.048 0.317 0.124 0.129 0.077 0.183 -0.057 0.116 
RCF -0.112 0.069 -0.305 0.207 -0.231 0.123 -0.354 0.224 0.285 0.219 
RWAGE 0.102 0.059 0.26 0.142 0.169 0.121 0.125 0.135 -0.029 0.21 
_cons 0.92 0.055 1.025 0.14 0.81 0.125 0.884 0.114 0.668 0.209 
 
Obs.  140  25  27  26  27 
P-value  0.043 ** 0.047 ** 0.046 ** 0.962  0.326 
Adjusted R2  0.151   0.282   0.254   0.029   0.294 
Significance level 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.1* 
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Table 5:  Second survey sample descriptions 
(Classified into firms that had BI insurance and firms that were adequately insured) 
Definition 
Total 
Obs. 
BI No BI 
Adequately 
Insured 
Not 
Adequately 
Insured 
% % % % 
Industry Sector      
Health Care And Social 
Assistance 
44 70.5% 29.5% 34.1% 65.9% 
Manufacturing 78 76.9% 23.1% 42.3% 57.7% 
Construction 41 48.8% 51.2% 24.4% 75.6% 
Accommodation 46 82.6% 17.4% 56.5% 43.5% 
Financial Services And 
Insurance 
21 81.0% 19.0% 57.1% 42.9% 
Retail And Wholesale Trade 79 72.2% 27.8% 31.6% 68.4% 
Ownership Structure      
Sole Proprietorship 66 65.2% 34.8% 33.3% 66.7% 
Partnership 34 61.8% 38.2% 44.1% 55.9% 
Private Limited Liability 
Company 
262 70.2% 29.8% 38.5% 61.5% 
Public Limited Liability 
Company 
14 71.4% 28.6% 28.6% 71.4% 
 
Size of Organization 
     
10 Employees Or Less 216 61.6% 38.4% 31.5% 68.5% 
Greater Than 50 Employees 73 80.8% 19.2% 41.1% 58.9% 
 
Disruption by the EQ 
     
Structural Damage 162 67.9% 32.1% 41.4% 58.6% 
Non-Structural Damage  201 68.2% 31.8% 42.3% 57.7% 
Difficult Access to Premises 127 61.4% 38.6% 38.6% 61.4% 
 
Other 
     
Currently have High Debt 36 66.7% 33.3% 36.1% 63.9% 
Finance its Recovery with 
Organizational Cash Flow  
197 72.1% 27.9% 43.7% 56.3% 
Located in CBD 316 67.7% 32.3% 39.6% 60.4% 
Had Emergency Plan in 
Place 
308 68.2% 31.8% 39.6% 60.4% 
For-Profit Organization 398 68.3% 31.7% 36.7% 63.3% 
Own The Current Property 188 63.8% 36.2% 37.2% 62.8% 
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Table 6: Logit regression results of adopting Business Interruption (BI) insurance, Coefficients 
(Standard Deviations) 
Variables Profitability Productivity Better-off 
No Control Variables  
BI 1 = had business interruption insurance 0.39 * 0.62 ** 0.31  
  (0.22)  (0.21)  (0.21)  
 _cons 0.58 *** -0.43 ** -0.55 ** 
  (0.18)  (0.18)  (0.18)  
 
With Control Variables 
BI 1 = had business interruption insurance 0.20  0.76 ** 0.44 * 
  (0.27)  (0.25)  (0.25)  
 Industry Sector       
SHEA 1 = health care and social assistance -0.46  -0.27  -0.88 ** 
  (0.42)  (0.37)  (0.44)  
SMAN 1 = manufacturing -0.40  -0.66 * -0.83 ** 
  (0.35)  (0.36)  (0.35)  
SCON 1 = construction 0.67  1.89 *** 1.22 ** 
  (0.47)  (0.43)  (0.42)  
SACC 1 = accommodation 0.36  1.17 ** 1.53 *** 
  (0.47)  (0.46)  (0.44)  
SFIN 1 = financial services and insurance 2.03 ** 0.19  -0.18  
  (0.88)  (0.52)  (0.54)  
SRW 1 = retail and wholesale trade 0.22  0.14  0.04  
  (0.33)  (0.3)  (0.3)  
 Ownership Structure       
OSOLE 1 = sole proprietorship 0.58  -0.15  0.06  
  (0.59)  (0.52)  (0.53)  
OPART 1 = partnership 0.67  0.35  -0.26  
  (0.64)  (0.6)  (0.61)  
OPRIV 1 = private limited liability company 0.20  0.61  0.27  
  (0.51)  (0.46)  (0.46)  
OPUB 1 = public limited liability company 1.79 * 0.03  -0.03  
  (1.01)  (0.73)  (0.75)  
 Size of Organization       
ELE10 1 = employ 10 employees or less -0.59 ** -0.40  -0.32  
  (0.29)  (0.27)  (0.27)  
EGR50 1 = employ greater than 50 employees -0.43  -0.07  -0.62  
  (0.4)  (0.38)  (0.39)  
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Variables Profitability Productivity Better-off 
 Level of Disruption by the EQ       
DSTRUC 1 = disrupted by structural damage -0.34  -0.02  0.05  
  (0.32)  (0.3)  (0.29)  
DNONST 1 = disrupted by non-structural damage  0.30  0.35  0.52  
  (0.3)  (0.28)  (0.28)  
DPREM 1 = difficulties accessing premises -0.62 ** -0.26  -0.32  
  (0.31)  (0.3)  (0.31)  
 Financial Status       
FREVC 
% revenue from Canterbury prior to the 
EQ 
-0.01  0.01  0.01 ** 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
FDEBT 1 = currently have debt -1.92 *** -1.09 ** -1.21  
  (0.4)  (0.42)  (0.48)  
FOCF 
1 = finance its recovery with 
organizational cash flow  
0.01  -0.24  -0.43  
  (0.26)  (0.24)  (0.25)  
LCANT 
current number of locations in 
Canterbury 
0.04  -0.08  -0.03  
  (0.05)  (0.09)  (0.03)  
LNZ 
current number of locations in New 
Zealand 
0.01  -0.01  0.01  
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
LCBD 1 = located in CBD 0.40  -0.21  0.08  
  (0.27)  (0.26)  (0.25)  
NYR 
number of years operating before the 
EQ 
0.01  0.01  -0.01  
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
EMG 1 = had emergency plan in place k0.44  -0.19  -0.02  
  (0.28)  (0.27)  (0.27)  
PROF 1 = for-profit organization 1.03 * 0.24  0.69  
  (0.63)  (0.54)  (0.57)  
OWN 1 = own the current property -0.23  -0.55 ** -0.20  
  (0.26)  (0.23)  (0.24)  
_cons -0.15  -0.66  -1.63  
  (0.69)  (0.66)  (0.67)  
 Log pseudo-likelihood -222.74299 -248.06692 -242.67464 
 Wald χ2 63.94 63.15 61.62 
 P-value 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
  Pseudo R2  0.1325 0.1393 0.1397 
Significance level 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.1* 
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Table 7: Logit regression results of insurance status analysis  
Variables Profitability Productivity Better-off 
No Control Variables        
NOCLA 1 = had insurance but did not 
lodge claim 
0.59  1.6 *** 0.69 * 
  (0.37)  (0.42)  (0.37)  
PTCLAIM 1 = claim with protracted 
settlement 
0.21  1.56 *** 0.35  
  (0.36)  (0.42)  (0.38)  
SETTLED 1 = settled claim 0.66 * 1.44 *** 0.64 * 
  (0.35)  (0.4)  (0.36)  
 _cons 0.38  -1.4 *** -0.86 *** 
  (0.3)  (0.38)  (0.32)  
With Control Variables       
NOCLA 1 = had insurance but did not 
lodge claim 
0.19  1.56 *** 0.6  
  (0.45)  (0.5)  (0.46)  
PTCLAIM 1 = claim with protracted 
settlement 
0.14  1.72 *** 0.2  
  (0.43)  (0.49)  (0.47)  
SETTLED 1 = settled claim 0.31  1.42 *** 0.45  
  (0.41)  (0.48)  (0.45)  
 Industry Sector       
SHEA 1 = health care and social 
assistance 
-0.43  -0.13  -0.8 * 
  (0.42)  (0.39)  (0.43)  
SMAN 1 = manufacturing -0.4  -0.64 * -0.84 ** 
  (0.35)  (0.37)  (0.35)  
SCON 1 = construction 0.63  1.63 *** 1.07 *** 
  (0.48)  (0.42)  (0.41)  
SACC 1 = accommodation 0.34  1.15 ** 1.62 *** 
  (0.48)  (0.46)  (0.45)  
SFIN 1 = financial services and 
insurance 
2.02 ** 0.3  -0.22  
  (0.87)  (0.53)  (0.57)  
SRW 1 = retail and wholesale trade 0.25  0.09  0.07  
  (0.33)  (0.3)  (0.3)  
 Ownership Structure       
OSOLE 1 = sole proprietorship 0.57  -0.07  0.05  
  
 
(0.59)  (0.55)  (0.54)  
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Variables Profitability Productivity Better-off 
OPART 1 = partnership 0.66  0.48  -0.3  
  (0.64)  (0.6)  (0.61)  
OPRIV 1 = private limited liability 
company 
0.19  0.7  0.28  
  (0.51)  (0.5)  (0.46)  
OPUB 1 = public limited liability 
company 
1.8 * 0.01  0.03  
  (1.01)  (0.75)  (0.74)  
 Size of Organization       
ELE10 1 = employ 10 employees or less -0.58 ** -0.45 * -0.35  
  (0.29)  (0.27)  (0.27)  
EGR50 1 = employ greater than 50 
employees 
-0.42  -0.07  -0.66 * 
  (0.4)  (0.38)  (0.39)  
 Level of Disruption by the EQ       
DSTRUC 1 = disrupted by structural 
damage 
-0.33  -0.04  0.12  
  (0.32)  (0.3)  (0.31)  
DNONST 1 = disrupted by non-structural 
damage  
0.29  0.35  0.58 ** 
  (0.3)  (0.29)  (0.29)  
DPREM 1 = have difficulty accessing 
premises  
-0.62 * -0.25  -0.33  
  (0.32)  (0.31)  (0.32)  
 Financial Status       
FREVC % revenue from Canterbury prior 
to the EQ 
-0.01  0.01  0.01 ** 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
FDEBT 1 = currently have debt -1.93 *** -1.15 *** -1.25 ** 
  (0.4)  (0.43)  (0.49)  
FOCF 1 = finance recovery with 
organizational cash flow  
-0.01  -0.23  -0.41 * 
  (0.27)  (0.24)  (0.25)  
LCANT current number of locations in 
Canterbury 
0.04  -0.09  -0.04  
  (0.04)  (0.1)  (0.03)  
LNZ current number of locations in 
New Zealand 
0.01  -0.01  0.01  
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
LCBD 1 = located in CBD 0.42  -0.15  0.13  
  (0.27)  (0.26)  (0.25)  
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Variables Profitability Productivity Better-off 
NYR number of years operating 
before the EQ 
0.01  -0.01  -0.01  
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
EMG 1 = had emergency plan in place 0.42  -0.29  -0.04  
  (0.28)  (0.27)  (0.26)  
PROF 1 = for-profit organization 1.04 * 0.13  0.68  
  (0.63)  (0.6)  (0.59)  
OWN 1 = own the current property -0.23  -0.6 ** -0.16  
  (0.26)  (0.24)  (0.24)  
_cons -0.21  -1.37 * -1.74 ** 
  (0.71)  (0.77)  (0.74)  
 Log pseudolikelihood -222.682  -244.905  -242.931  
 Wald χ2 63.44  71.87  62.94  
 P-value 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
 Pseudo R2  0.1328  0.1503  0.1388  
Significance level 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.1*       
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Table 8: Average marginal effects of core variables 
Variables Profitability Productivity Better-off 
Adopting business interruption insurance       
 No Control Variables 0.0811 * 0.1513 ** 0.0734  
 With Control Variables 0.0350  0.1558 *** 0.0860 * 
Insurance status 
      
 No Control Variables       
o had insurance but did not lodge 
claim 
0.1223  0.3813 *** 0.1644 * 
o claim with protracted settlement 0.0425  0.3716 *** 0.0834  
o settled claim 0.1379 * 0.3434 *** 0.1536 * 
 With Control Variables       
o had insurance but did not lodge 
claim 
0.0324  0.3138 *** 0.118  
o claim with protracted settlement 0.0246  0.3472 *** 0.0384  
o settled claim 0.0555  0.2853 *** 0.0896  
Significance level 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.1* 
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Appendix Table 1.  Number of insured vs uninsured firms by firm characteristics 
Definition 
Had insurance  No insurance  
Obs. % Obs. % 
Organisational ownership structure 
Sole proprietorship 34 77.3% 10 22.7% 
Partnership/JV partner 30 85.7% 5 14.3% 
Limited Liability 30 69.8% 13 30.2% 
Location before the earthquake   
CBD 10 66.7% 5 33.3% 
Lyttleton 29 82.9% 6 17.1% 
Kaiapoi  8 72.7% 3 27.3% 
Business Sector 
Retail trade 27 75.0% 9 25.0% 
Wholesale trade 6 100.0% 0 0.0% 
Manufacturing 9 75.0% 3 25.0% 
Construction 3 75.0% 1 25.0% 
Transportation and Warehousing 3 50.0% 3 50.0% 
Fast-moving consumer goods 
(FMCG) 
17 85.0% 3 15.0% 
Lifeline utilities 13 81.3% 3 18.8% 
Ownership of Properties  
Own 33 86.8% 5 13.2% 
Rent 73 71.6% 29 28.4% 
For-profit organizations 
For-profit 96 78.7% 26 21.3% 
Not-for-profit 10 55.6% 8 44.4% 
Positive Return on Investment (ROI) in the past five years  
Positive ROI 43 86.0% 7 14.0% 
Risk Management Practice 
Risk management officers 83 76.9% 25 23.1% 
Written BCM 30 71.4% 12 28.6% 
Had practiced emergency response 33 73.3% 12 26.7% 
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Appendix Table 2.  Number of insured vs uninsured firms by the impact of the earthquake 
Definition 
Had insurance  No insurance  
Obs. % Obs. % 
Business Closure 
Permanently closed 11 73.3% 4 26.7% 
Temporarily closed 56 75.7% 18 24.3% 
Ongoing closing 13 81.3% 3 18.8% 
The change in revenue after the earthquake  
Decreased 52 77.6% 15 22.4% 
Increased 31 91.2% 3 8.8% 
Unchanged 22 68.8% 10 31.3% 
Structural and non-structural damage 
Structural damage 81 78.6% 22 21.4% 
Non-structural damage 77 81.1% 18 18.9% 
Disrupted by structural damage 56 78.9% 15 21.1% 
Disrupted by non-structural damage 56 82.4% 12 17.6% 
Affected by the 2010 earthquake   
Affected by the 2010 earthquake 91 76.5% 28 23.5% 
Revenue decreased 43 79.6% 11 20.4% 
Financial Recovery Plan  
Plan to recover through insurance 45 100% N/A 
Plan to recover through organization's cash flow 76 78.4% 21 21.6% 
Expected to receive wage subsidy 35 85.4% 6 14.6% 
 
Appendix Table 3.  Average percentage change in revenue after the 2010 and 2011 earthquake 
Description 
Insured Uninsured 
Obs. 
% 
Mean 
(SD) 
Min,  
Max 
Obs. 
% 
Mean 
(SD) 
Min,  
Max 
Percentage change in revenue 76 -25.13 -100%, 13 -47.62 -100%, 
85.4% (45.84) 100% 14.6% (38.33) 5% 
Percentage change in revenue 
after the first EQ 
61 -12.84 -100%, 11 -24.28 -60%, 
84.7% (25.77) 25% 15.3% (23.24) 20% 
 
 
44 
 
  
 
Appendix B: Propensity Score Assumptions 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1984) demonstrate that stratification based on estimated propensity 
scores balances the 𝑋 covariates if the unconfoundedness and the common support/overlap 
assumptions hold: 
Assumption 1 Unconfoundedness: if (𝑌1, 𝑌0) Π  𝑇𝑖 | 𝑋𝑖  then  (𝑌1, 𝑌0) Π  𝑇𝑖 | 𝑃(𝑋𝑖) 
Assumption 2 Overlap: 0 < 𝑃(𝑇𝑖  = 1|𝑋) < 1 
The unconfoundedness assumption states that if the outcomes (𝑌1, 𝑌0) are independent (Π) of 
the treatment (𝑇𝑖) given a set of 𝑋 covariates, then the outcomes (𝑌1, 𝑌0) are independent of 
the treatment (𝑇𝑖) given propensity scores, 𝑃(𝑋𝑖). The common support/overlap assumption 
states that the estimated propensity scores of the treated and control units must overlap and 
lie between 0 and 1. This assumption ensures that, at the same estimated propensity score, 
there are observations in the treatment and control group that have nearly identical probability 
of receiving treatment. When the two assumptions hold, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) call it 
‘strong ignorability’, i.e. “when treatment assignment is strongly ignorable given the observed 
covariates X”. By imposing the matching conditional on the estimated propensity scores, we 
remove the correlation between treatment assignment and 𝑋 covariates, i.e. 𝑋𝑖 ⊥  𝑇𝑖 | 𝑃(𝑋𝑖). 
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